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The CJEU and the Introduction of
International Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms within the EU: Is
Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the EU in Safe Hands?
Tasnim Ahmed
Abstract: This article draws upon the jurisprudence of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning
the role of the international dispute settlement mechanisms
operating within the EU legal order. The Court has resisted
the introduction of such dispute settlement mechanisms,
referring to Articles 267 and 344 of the Treaty of the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as justifications
for its ‘judicial monopoly’. The Achmea case in particular
allows the Court to declare these dispute settlement
mechanisms contrary to EU law. However, with the
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA)
Opinion, the Court itself has permitted the CETA Investment
Court to be compatible with EU law, and within the
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) with
Canada. This leads to the possibility that the Court’s
reasoning should be equally applicable to other potential
investment courts. The present article is a doctrinal study;
which examined primary sources of EU law—namely the
Treaties and the CJEU’s jurisprudence within international
commercial and investment law. It is argued that there are
‘winds of change’ within the EU legal order as the EU legal
order begins to readily adopt such dispute settlement
mechanisms. This is visible through the approval of the
CETA Investment Court, coexisting with debates on
developing a permanent multilateral court within the EU
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legal order and following Brexit the use of arbitration within
the EU and UK trade agreements. However, at the same time,
these advancements should be taken with caution because
the recent developments within the UK-EU trade agreements
illustrate that the CJEU may still be keen to protect its
‘exclusive jurisdiction’ under the Treaties.
I.

Introduction
The CJEU has been very critical of the EU adhering
itself to the jurisdiction of international dispute settlement
mechanisms. This rigid approach has led the court to
abandon the EU’s intention to accede to the European
Economic Court, the Unified Patent Court, and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 1 The 2018 Achmea
judgment also provided the CJEU with the platform to
declare international dispute settlement mechanisms as
contrary to EU law.2 The main reason for this retaliation by
the CJEU was that it deemed itself as the sole jurisdiction to
provide the definitive interpretation of EU law. 3 Its
justification stemmed from the reliance on Articles 267 and
344 TFEU; the former establishes the preliminary ruling
procedure and the latter forbids the Member States ‘to
submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those
provided for therein’.4 In particular, the Court in Achmea
held the preliminary procedure as the institutional backbone
for the effectiveness and uniform application of EU law, as
European Court of Justice Opinion, 1/91 (1991), ¶ 46, ECR I-6079, (re the
European Economic Area Court); European Court of Justice Opinion, 1/09
(2011) ¶ 89, ECR I-1137, (re the Unified Patent Court); European Court of
Justice Opinion, 2/13 (2014), ¶258, EU: C 2014:2454 (re the European Court
of Human Rights).
2
Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea, 2018 ELCI:EU:C:2018:158.
3
The role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), UK
Parliament (last visited Feb. 23, 2022),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/130/13005.ht
m.
4
See Justice of the European Union Articles 267 & 334.
1

492

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol22/iss2/5

2

Ahmed: ADR in the EU
[Vol. 22: 491, 2022]

ADR in the EU
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

it allows the communication between national courts and the
CJEU. 5 The Court would not allow this route to be
compromised by allowing investors alternative routes of
dispute settlement, which did not have the option of utilising
the preliminary procedure. 6 The ECHR accession ruling
was controversial as it was set as a mandate within Article 6
of the Treaty of the European Union.
The Court’s overtly protective claim to the
‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over the definitive interpretation of
EU law has been labelled as ‘selfish and fearful’.7 The fear
was that if all international courts showed a similar amount
of protection towards their jurisdiction as the CJEU, then this
would ultimately destabilise the rule of law, a founding
principle of the EU. 8 The CJEU eventually sided with
Advocate Bot and accepted the jurisdiction of an investment
court within the Comprehensive Economic Trade
Agreement (CETA) with Canada, concluding that it does not
‘adversely affect the autonomy of the EU legal order’. 9
Furthermore, that the principle of autonomy should be
interpreted ‘in such a way as to maintain the specific
characteristics of EU law but also to ensure the European
Union’s involvement in the development of international

Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea, 2018 ELCI:EU:C:2018:158.
Id.
7
Riffel Christian, The CETA Opinion of the European Court of Justice and its
Implications – Not that Selfish After All. 22 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 503, 506 (2019). Jed Ordermatt & Bruno de Witte, A selfish
Court? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute Settlement
Beyond the European Union. In Marise Cremona and Anne Theis (eds). THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELAIONS LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES. Oxford: Hart. 2014.
8
Art 2 TEU. Also para 72; Case C -72/15 PJSC Rosenet Oil Company v. Her
Majesty’s Treasury and Others (2017) EU: C:2017:236.
9
European Court of Justice Opinion 1/17, ¶ 161 (2019); See Advocate General
Bot Opinion 1/17 (2019); See Council of the European Union, Comprehensive
and Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the One Part
and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (Sept. 2016),
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10973-2016-INIT/en/pdf.
5
6
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law and of a rules based international legal order.’10 This
leads to questions about whether the CJEU, with its
enshrined arguments on the autonomous EU legal order, will
now allow other dispute settlement mechanisms to flourish
within the EU legal order? Alternatively, will the CETA
Opinion, provided by the CJEU, be an exceptional relaxation
of its claims to exclusive jurisdiction? These questions are
particularly important as the EU is expanding its
international trade relations; in particular, as the EU and UK
navigate their future relationship the future structure and
activity of the CJEU will always be relevant in the debate.
As well as answering these questions, this article
innovates the area of discussion in a threefold manner. First,
it has opted for a comprehensive approach rather than
previous studies, focusing on the key CJEU cases within
international commercial arbitration and international
investment arbitration. In doing so, it aims to provide a
detailed account of the jurisprudence of the CJEU and its
attitude toward the upcoming international dispute
mechanisms within the EU and their ability to operate while
faced with such restrictions. Second, the article has
demonstrated that despite the CJEU’s resistance to intra EU
arbitration, the tribunals have not declined jurisdiction. This
led the author to explore the debate concerning the prospects
for the use of a new permanent multilateral court as a dispute
settlement mechanism, replacing ad hoc tribunals, which
will only succeed within the EU legal order if it can
guarantee personal integrity, transparent judicial
appointment procedures, and shorter proceedings. Third, the
article contributes new insights by offering an explanation as
to the use of arbitral tribunals within the Trade Cooperation
Agreement (TCA) and the Withdrawal Agreement (WA)
with caution.11 As the author points out, despite Brexit and
European Union, Advocate General Bot Opinion 1/17, ¶ 195 (2019).
See Trade and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Union and the
European Atomic Energy Community, of the One Part, and the United
10
11
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the claims that the UK would cut its ties with the CJEU, in
the long run, the CJEU will retain some jurisdiction even
after the transition period, again questioning the reality and
viability of other dispute settlement mechanisms flourishing
within the EU legal order.12 The importance of these queries
go beyond substantive EU law. They shall contribute to two
areas, the first being the CJEU’s ability to shape European
integration and the second being the EU’s ability to balance
the institutional concerns of the CJEU against the EU’s need
to utilize other international dispute settlement mechanisms
in its agreements.
Following a brief discussion on the methodology,
the article is divided into three parts: the first part examines
the CJEU’s jurisprudence with international commercial
arbitration and international investment law, highlighting the
CJEU’s resistance to international dispute settlement
mechanisms and preference of the national courts for
referrals. The second part critically evaluates the CJEU
interpretation of autonomy from the Achmea and previous
cases to provide the rationale behind the Court protecting its
own judicial prerogatives but risking the EU’s development
as an international actor. The final part then deals with the
“winds of change” within the EU legal order though the
approval of the CETA Investment Court by the CJEU;
debates on developing a permanent multilateral court within
the EU legal order, and the use of arbitration within the EU
and UK agreements. However, these advancements are to
be taken with caution because the recent developments

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Other Part, 2021 O.J. (L
444) 10; see also Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union Atomic Energy
Community, 2019 O.J. (C 384) 1.
12
Hannah Frahm, The role of the CJEU during and beyond the transition period,
BRODIES LLP (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0deea041-034f-4175-a979c1d217c6ff8d.
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within the UK -EU agreements illustrate that the CJEU
jurisdiction is as “firm as ever before.”13
The research problem sought to be addressed is the
dilemma between the protectionist approach of the CJEU in
its role to interpret and apply EU law and the growing use of
the increasingly popular international dispute settlement
mechanisms within the EU context. In other words, this
article investigates the legal reasoning and rationale behind
the Court’s justification for its rigid approach in the
acceptance of such settlement mechanisms. Followed by
highlighting the rationale behind its more recent subtle
approach in allowing such dispute mechanisms legal
authority and purpose within the EU legal order, the paper
adopts the doctrinal legal research methodology, commonly
utilized within the legal research discipline; whereby the
research problem will be addressed from the prism of the
hierarchical structure of sources of law. 14 Within the
discussion, references will be made to the primary sources
of law namely being the Treaty of the European Union
(TEU); The Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU); the Trade Agreement between the UK and
the EU, and the Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and
UK. The CJEU’s jurisprudence will be analysed in great
depth via its key judgments in this area to support the legal
arguments hypothesized by this paper. In addition, the
author has sought to refer to key secondary sources including
major publicists to complement the primary sources in

Id.
See WILLIAM H. ARTHURS, LAW AND LEARNING: REPORT TO THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL OF CANADA (Ottawa :
The Council, 1983); DENNIS, PEARCE, ENID, CAMPBELL, & DON HARDING,
AUSTRALIAN LAW SCHOOLS: A DISCIPLINE ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMON
WEALTH TERTIARY EDUCATION COMMISSION (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1987); Martha Minrow, Archetypal Legal
Scholarship- A Field Guide, 63 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 65, 65–69
(2013).
13
14
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evaluating the legal problem sought to be addressed by the
paper.15
A.
CJEU and International Commercial
Arbitration
The EU regime governing the jurisdiction of the
courts in civil and commercial matters began with the
enforcement of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulations, also known as
the Brussels I. 16 The EU adopted the regulations to
determine which EU Member State had jurisdiction within
the given commercial and civil disputes to be decided, and
with regards to the recognition and enforcement of
judgments made in other Member States.17 The Schlosser
Report insisted for a wider interpretation of the term
‘arbitration’ under Article 1, specifically pointing out those
proceedings in which the link to ‘arbitration’ was mere
incident falling within the scope of the Regulation.18 This
interpretation on the extent on the exclusion of arbitration
was examined by the CJEU within the Marc Rich AG v.
Societa Italiana Impianti case, concerning a dispute about
Thomas Dietz, Marius Dotzauer & Edward Cohen, The legitimacy crisis of
investor-state arbitration and the new EU investment court system, 26 REVIEW
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 749 (2019); MARISE CERMONA ET
AL., THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT,
pg cited (Bloomsbury Publishing, 1st ed. 2017); Sonsoles Centeno Huera &
Nicolaj Kuplewatzky, Achmea, The Autonomy of Union law, Mutual Trust and
What Lies Ahead, 4 EUROPEAN PAPERS 62 (2019); Franco Ferrari, The Impact
Of EU Law On International Commercial Arbitration, 24 EDINBURGH L. REV.
140 (2019); Jens Hillebrand Pohl, Case Comment: Intra-EU investment
arbitration after the Achmea case: legal autonomy bounded by mutual trust?,
14 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL L. REV. 767–791 (2018); Erika Szyszczak,
Opinion 1/17: Towards a modern EU approach to investor-state dispute
settlement, UK TRADE POLICY OBSERVATORY, May 2019; Vanessa Thieffry,
The Achmea Judgment: an additional stage in the construction of a group of
international litigation resolution mechanism? An analysis in the light of
French Arbitration law, 3 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 201, 201–
16 (2018).
16
FRANCO FERRARI, THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2017).
17
Id.
18
Peter Schlosser, Report of the Convention, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, C 59/71, (1979).
15
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the contamination of a crude oil cargo. 19 The contract
stipulated arbitration in London in the case of a dispute
between the parties.20 The defendant subsequently did not
cooperate with the appointment of an arbitrator once the
Claimant started London arbitration proceedings. 21 The
English court made an ex parte order for service of the court
proceedings initiated by the Claimant for the Defendant to
cooperate in relation to the arbitration proceedings.22 The
Defendant applied for the order to be set aside, which was
refused, and then the Court of Appeal referred the matter to
the CJEU to determine whether Brussels I applied to the
proceedings, or alternatively the exclusion under Article 1
applied due to the existence of the arbitration agreement.23
The CJEU held the exclusion applied if the arbitration was a
preliminary issue within the dispute.24 Hence, the CJEU’s
restrictive application of Article 1(2)(d) allowed the
Regulation to be deployed even when parties have
arbitration agreements between them.25
Anti-suit injunctions were generally utilised by
English courts in support of arbitration. 26 Also, they are
used as a solution to parallel proceedings by restraining a
party from pursuing or continuing court proceedings brought
in breach of an arbitration agreement.27 Equally, anti-suit
injunctions are equitable remedies mostly used by courts as
a procedural tool in order to inhibit parties from pursuing
court proceedings involving a breach of a choice of court or

Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. A.g v. Societa Italiana Impianti p.A., 1991
E.C.R I-3855.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Trevor Hartley, The Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration, 63
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUATERLY 843 (2014).
27
Id.
19
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arbitration agreement. 28
Before examining their
compatibility with Brussels I, it is important to examine their
reception in the context of Brussels I. The CJEU within the
case of Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl cited the principle
of ‘mutual trust’ as the pinnacle of Brussels I.29
This principle was further elaborated within the
CJEU decision in Turner v. Grovit.30 Here, the CJEU had to
decide between a court of one Member State doubting the
jurisdiction another Member State’s court, when the
question of the latter court’s jurisdiction was a matter for it
alone. 31 The Court applied the principle of mutual trust
established in the Gasser case and banned the use of anti-suit
injunctions granted by a court of a Member State in respect
to proceedings in another Member State—particularly where
they are granted to support prospective court proceedings.32
The CJEU states that:
The Brussels regime is to be interpreted as
precluding the grant of an injunction
whereby a court of a Contracting State
prohibits a party to proceedings pending
before it from commencing or continuing
legal proceedings before a court of another
Contracting State, even where that party is
acting in bad faith with a view to frustrating
the existing proceedings.33
The West Tankers case involved the CJEU applying the
principles of mutual trust and effectiveness of EU law. 34
The case involved examining the legality of anti-suit
Id.
Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl [2003] E.C.R. I-14693.
30
Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit [2004] E.C.R. I-3565.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
AllianZ SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers (2009)
E.C.R para 19.
28
29
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injunctions issued by the English court; this was in response
to the Italian court proceedings brought against the
defendant, which were in breach of the arbitration
agreement.35 The House of Lords referred the matter to the
CJEU, asking if:
it is incompatible with Regulation No
44/2001 for a court of a Member State to
make an order to restrain a person from
commencing or continuing proceedings
before the courts of another Member State
on the ground that such proceedings would
be contrary to an arbitration agreement,
even though Article 1(2)(d) of the
regulation excludes arbitration from the
scope thereof.36
Advocate General (AG) Kokott stressed that antisuit injunctions undermine the principle of trust and
confidence, which is essential to the functioning of the
Brussels I regime, and that any court seised can determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.37 In
matters of dispute, the AG recognised that national courts
would stay proceedings and refer parties to arbitration in
compliance with the New York Convention. 38 The CJEU
agreed and held that as the validity of the arbitration was
only incidental, and not the main part of the proceedings—
the proceedings fell within Brussels I.39 Consequently, the
Id.
Id.
37
Op. of Advoc. Gen. Kokott Delivered on 4 Sept. 2008, ¶¶ 57–58, in Case C185/07, Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. West Tankers
Inc., E.C.R. 2009 I-00663; see id. ¶¶ 24, 30, 34 (discussing principle of mutual
trust and its importance to Brussels I).
38
Op. of Advoc. Gen. Kokott Delivered on 4 Sept. 2008, ¶ 11, in Case C-185/07,
Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. West Tankers Inc.,
E.C.R. 2009 I-00663.
39
Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v.
West Tankers Inc., E.C.R. 2009 I-00663.
35
36
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use of anti-suit injunctions “necessarily amounts to stripping
that court (Tribunale di Siracusa) of the power to rule on its
own jurisdiction under Regulation No[.] 44/2001.”40 Such a
remedy would interfere with the trust between the Member
States in the Brussels I regime.41 The CJEU declared that
the anti-suit injunction would deny the claimant access to
judicial protection provided under Article 5(3) of the
Brussels I Regulation and thereby impair the effectiveness
of EU law. 42 The CJEU utilises the principle of
effectiveness to interpret EU law.43 This principle requires
national courts to ensure that adequate remedies protect EU
rights and obligations. 44 Moreover, this principle is
embedded within Article 19(1) of the TFEU, which states
that “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to
ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by
Union law.” 45 Hence, the CJEU applied the principle of
effectiveness of EU law in the West Tankers case to allow
the parties access to the Italian court for a remedy, and
disallowed the anti-suit injunction.46 The effectiveness of
EU law may have been compromised if the parties in the
proceedings did not have access to the Italian courts under
the Brussels I Regulation to establish whether or not the
arbitration agreement was valid.47
The West Tankers decision faced disapproval from
supporters of international commercial arbitration. One
argument raised was that the effectiveness and validity of an
arbitration agreement would always be viewed as a
Allianz SpA & Anor [2012] EWHC 854 (Comm) (04 April 2012).
Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v.
West Tankers Inc., E.C.R. 2009 I-00663.
42
Id.
43
See M. Elvira Mendez-Pinedo, The Principle of Effectiveness of EU Law: A
Difficult Concept in Legal Scholarship, Jurid. Trib., Mar. 2021, at 5–6.
44
Id. at 10.
45
Id.
46
Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v.
West Tankers Inc., E.C.R. 2009 I-00663.
47
Id.
40
41
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preliminary issue, and therefore subjected to the Brussels
Regulation. 48 The Brussels I Regulation was ultimately
replaced by the Brussels I Recast Regulation, which came
into force in 2015. 49 The exclusion was maintained and
Recital 12 was added to clarify its scope.50
A Member State court called upon the CJEU to
certify if the newly added Brussels Recast recital affected the
scope of the exclusion. In the “Gazprom” case, Gazprom
sold gas to a Lithuanian company called Lietuvos dujos AB
(LD) and consequently became a shareholder along with the
Lithuanian Ministry of Energy. 51 The shareholders’
agreement contained an arbitration clause.52 A dispute arose
and the Ministry started proceedings in the national court.53
However, Gazprom initiated proceedings in the arbitral
tribunal and the tribunal awarded an order that the Ministry
withdraw the claim from the court.54
The national court upheld its jurisdiction, and held
that under Lithuanian law, the matters of the complaint
cannot be decided under arbitration. 55 Consequently,
Gazprom appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of
Lithuania and requested that the court uphold the tribunal’s
decision in accordance with the New York Convention. 56
See Alexander Layton, Arbitration and Anti-Suit Injunctions Under EU
Law—Chapter 3—The Impact of EU Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, in FRANCO FERRARI, IMPACT OF EU LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2017). See also Philip Clifford & Oliver Browne,
Reform of the Brussels Regulation—Latest Developments and the “Arbitration
Exception,” Latham & Watkins: In Prac.: The London Disps. Newsl., at 3 (Apr.
2013),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/Reform-of-the-BrusselsRegulation (describing arbitration practitioners' criticism of proposal that
would allow arbitration to fall within scope of Brussels Regulation).
49
See Case C-536/13, "Gazprom" OAO v Lietuvos Respublika,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2414, ¶ 1 (Dec. 4, 2014).
50
See Id. at ¶¶ 9–11.
51
Id. at ¶¶ 23, 26–7.
52
Id. at ¶ 29.
53
Id. at ¶¶ 30–1.
54
Id. at ¶ 33.
55
Id. at ¶ 38.
56
Id. at ¶ 39.
48
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The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and Gazprom then
appealed to the Supreme Court of Lithuania.57 The Supreme
Court then referred the matter to the CJEU.58 The Court had
to decide whether or not a national court may interpret
Regulation 44/2001 in such a way that it will ultimately
refuse to enforce or recognise an arbitral award.59
The CJEU confirmed its judgment in West Tankers,
stating that any injunction that restrained a party from access
to the court of a Member State would not be compatible with
the Brussels Regulation.60 However, the Court provided a
qualified response for an instance when an anti-suit
injunction is made by an arbitral tribunal.61 It argued that
where the national court is restricted from an anti-suit
injunction examining its own jurisdiction, then this was due
to that particular Member State’s own procedural law and
the New York Convention, which are outside the Brussels
Regulation’s ambit.62 Hence, the Brussels Regime prevents
the Member State from enforcing an arbitral award stopping
a party to bring proceedings before the court of that Member
State.
Advocate General (AG) Wathelet was highly
critical of the CJEU’s West Tankers decision in the Gazprom
case. AG Wathelet viewed Recital 12(2) to remove the
validity of the arbitration agreements from the Brussels
Recast, including incidental matters. 63 This interpretation
would result in anti-suit injunctions not interfering with the
effectiveness of EU law.64

Id. at ¶¶ 44–5.
Id. at ¶ 47.
59
Id. at ¶ 47.
60
Case C-536/13, "Gazprom" OAO v Lietuvos Respublika,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:316, ¶¶ 32–34 (May 13, 2015).
61
Id. at ¶¶ 35–9.
62
See Gazprom v. Lietuvos Respublika, Case C-536/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:216.
63
See
Gazprom
v.
Lietuvos
Respublika,
Case
C-536/13,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2414 (Advocate General Wathelet opinion).
64
Id.
57
58
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The AG further claimed that the CJEU, within the
West Tankers case, unduly placed restrictions on arbitrations
by its stringent, narrow interpretation of the Brussels
Regulation:65
[A]lthough arbitration, like the status of
natural persons, was excluded from the
scope of the Brussels I Regulation, the
Court held that the English courts could not
apply their national law to its full extent
and issue anti-suit injunctions in support of
an arbitration. In doing so, the Court
restricted the extent to which arbitration is
excluded from the scope of that
regulation.66
The reality is that the West Tanker’s decision
remains unaffected by Recital 12. In its first paragraph,
Recital 12 confirms that the Brussels I does not apply to
arbitration. 67 However, it also acknowledges that West
Tanker type proceedings may fall under the scope of
Brussels I.68 This is because the Recital states that despite
the parties being in an arbitration agreement, the courts can
decide on the arbitration agreement’s fate in accordance to
their national law. 69 Equally, Recital 12 confirms that
Member State courts are not obliged to recognise or
reinforce court judgments which determine the validity of
the arbitration agreement. 70 Hence, it can be argued that
even Recital 12 could not challenge the CJEU’s judicial
monopoly and its portrayal of Member State national courts’
significant role in contrast to arbitral tribunals.
B.
CJEU and Investment Arbitration
Id.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
65
66
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Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are
international agreements that establish “the terms and
conditions for private investment by nationals of one state in
another state.” 71 The purpose of a BIT agreement is to
ensure that the host state provides certain guarantees to the
contracting state’s investor.72 These guarantees include fair
and equitable treatment, the most favoured nation principle,
the national treatment principle, and direct and indirect
compensation in the event of expropriation.73 Many BITs
contain alternative dispute resolution provisions allowing
the investor to utilise international arbitration either through
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ISCID), or under any other international treaties,
rather than utilising the host-state’s courts.74
Many EU Member States have signed BITs with
one another, these BITs, and the alternative dispute
mechanisms provided therein, have functioned successfully.
However, there have been an increasing number of investor
state disputes between the Member States.75 These intra EU
BITs have resulted in the CJEU having to consider the
dispute resolution mechanisms’ impact against EU law’s

Legal Information Institute, Bilateral Investment Treaty, Cornell Law School,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/bilateral_investment_treaty (last visited Mar.
2, 2020).
72
The Importance of Bilateral Investment treaties (BITs) When Investing in
Emerging Markets, ABA (Mar. 22, 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/03/0
1_sprenger/.
73
The Basics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Sidley,
https://www.sidley.com/en/global/services/global-arbitration-trade-andadvocacy/investment-treaty-arbitration/sub-pages/the-basics-of-bilateralinvestment-treaties/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2022).
74
Id.
75
Holly Stebbing, Investor-State disputes in the EU—Some Statistical
Observations, Norton Rose Fulbright (May 2018),
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/d11cfbb5/in
vestor-state-disputes-in-the-eu-mdashbrsome-statistical-observations.
71
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autonomy. 76 This led to the CJEU’s examination of the
potential conflicts caused by the Member States’ duty to
establish EU law supremacy on one hand, and Member
States’ international commitments predating EU law on the
other.77
The EU’s stance on intra-EU BITs was evident in
the Directorate General for Internal Policies document,
where it states that investment deals seem to cover matters
which are already under the remit of EU law such as the free
movement of capital.78 Hence, there are conflicts between
investment and EU law, in particular with respect to Article
18 TFEU breaches. As there is potential for discriminatory
treatment against other EU investors that are not part of the
intra-EU BIT, due to the preferential treatments provided to
the foreign EU investors through the intra-EU BIT, which
were not granted under EU law. The EU institutions’
position with regards to the compatibility of intra EU BITs
with EU law was discussed in Micula v. Romania and
Slovakia v. Achmea.79
In Micula, the Micula brothers, who were investors
in Romania, brought an action in the ICSID Tribunal against
Romania for breach of the Romanian-Swedish BIT terms.80
At the time Romania joined the EU, Romania had to
abandon certain incentives which violated EU state aid

Theodore Konstadinides, Dr Anastasia Karatzia, Dr Niall O’Connor, Current
and Future Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and the Role of the Court of Justice
of the European Union,
https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/18758/pdf/ (last visited Mar.
2, 2022).
77
Id.
78
Directorate-General for Internal Policies: Policy Department: Citizens’
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Legal Instruments and Practice of
Arbitration
in
the
EU,
European
Parliament
(2014),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/509988/IPOL_S
TU(2015)509988_EN.pdf.
79
Ioan Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20 (2013). Case C-284/16,
Slovak Republic v. Achmea, 2018 ELCI:EU:C:2018:158.
80
Id.
76
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rules.81 The Commission joined the proceedings as “amicus
curiae” and claimed that the incentives in question breached
EU state aid rules.82 Also, that the reinstatement of these
incentives would result in unlawful state aid.83 The Arbitral
Tribunal in December 2013 held that by revoking these
incentives Romania “violated the Claimant[’s]” legitimate
expectations with respect to these incentives being available
until April 2009.84 The Tribunal then went on to say that
with the exception of maintaining the investors’ obligations
under the existing law after revocation of the relevant
incentives, “Romania’s repeal of the incentives was a
reasonable action in pursuit of a rational policy.”85 Despite
these considerations, the Tribunal concluded that Romania’s
actions were unfair and inequitable. 86 Micula initiated
proceedings within Romania for the enforcement of the
award.87 The Romanian Courts ordered for the execution of
the awards as the executor demanded for the Romanian
Ministry of Finance’s accounts to be seized.
The
Commission then in its 2015 decision again declared that the
compensation awarded by the Tribunal would be state aid
under s107 (1) of the Treaty which is incompatible with the
Treaty. 88 Romania was ordered by the Commission to
recoup any monies (with interest) paid to Micula. 89 The
Commission confirmed that the incentives would still be
viewed as state aid even though the aid came through the
payment of the compensation awarded by the tribunal.90

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See Articles 1–4. 2015 O.J. L(232/43), available at https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/1470/oj.
90
Micula & Micula, supra note 79.
81
82
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The Commission asserted that “In the case of IntraEU BITs, the Commission takes the view that such
agreements are contrary to Union law, incompatible with
provisions of the Union Treaties and should there be
considered as invalid.” 91 The Commission further stated
that “where giving effect to an intra-EU treaty by a Member
State would frustrate the application of Union law that
Member State must uphold Union law since Union primary
law such as Article 107 and 108 of the Treaty, takes
precedence over that Member State’s international
obligations.” 92 Consequently, the Commission found that
the compensation paid by Romania, which was made in
order to enforce the ISCID award, was incompatible with
State aid. 93 Hence, Romania was ordered by the
Commission to recover the payments. 94 The Micula
brothers did appeal the decision; however, the proceedings
were subsequently discontinued.95
In March 2018 the CJEU through the Slovak
Republic v. Achmea case provided its judgment on the
compatibility of international arbitration and EU law within
the context intra-EU BITs.96 In a nutshell, the Court ruled
that if an arbitral tribunal is called upon to resolve a dispute
involving EU law, the tribunal decision needs to be subject
to review by a court of the Member State in order for the
national court to if needed refer matters of EU law to the
CJEU for a preliminary reference ruling.97
Id. at Commission Decision 128.
Id. at Commission Decision 104.
Commission Decision 128, supra note 91.
94
Commission Decision 128, supra note 91.
95
Order of the President of the Fourth Chamber of the General Court T-646/14
of Feb. 29, 2016, available at
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174864&pa
geIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2020994.
96
Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV (Mar. 6, 2018), available at
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=199968&pa
geIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=432158.
97
Id.
91
92
93
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The case facts involved a dispute between a Dutch
insurer Achmea BV and Slovakia.98 In 2004, the Slovakian
government had liberalised its sickness insurance market;
this allowed Achmea to provide sickness insurance within
Slovakia.99 However, in due course Slovakia narrowed its
market liberalisation rules by enforcing a temporary ban on
the generation of profits accrued from private sickness
insurance enterprises.100 Achemea found this ban to breach
the BIT agreement between Slovakia and the Netherlands.101
Based on the BIT dispute settlement resolution clause,
Achema brought proceedings against Slovakia. 102 The
tribunal chose Germany as the seat of arbitration with
German law governing the arbitration proceedings.103
Slovakia argued that the tribunal had no jurisdiction,
as the dispute settlement clause was incompatible with EU
law.104 Slovakia’s jurisdictional claims were defeated as the
tribunal both in its interlocutory and final reward ordered
Slovakia to pay damages.105 Slovakia brought proceedings
within the German Court to set aside the arbitral award
claiming that it the enforcement of the award would be
contrary to public policy.106 Unsuccessful at first, the claim
was then proceeded by Achmea in Germany’s highest
court.107 Slovakia argued that the dispute settlement clause
was incompatible with the following: Article 18(1) TFEU,
which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality;
Article 267 TFEU, which allows for preliminary rulings by
the CJEU on questions concerning EU law, these matters are
referred to the Court by “courts and tribunals;” and Article
Id.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
98
99
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344 TFEU, which restricts Member States from utilising any
dispute resolution mechanism for the interpretation of EU
law other than those, which are provided by the EU treaties.
Advocate General (AG) Wathelet provided support
to arbitral tribunals through his opinion provided in 2017.108
The AG asserted that investor-state disputes did not fall
within the ambit of Article 344 TFEU. As he stated:
It is clear from the Court’s case law that
disputes between Member States and
between Member States and the Union
come under Article 344 TFEU. On the
other hand, disputes between individuals
do not even if the court called upon to settle
them is led to take EU law into account or
to apply it.109
AG Wathelet argued that the dispute at stake was
not related to the interpretation or the application of the EU
treaties, rather it was concerned with the BIT.110 The scope
of the BIT is wider as it offers greater protection to
investments, without being incompatible with EU treaties.
Hence, “a dispute between a Netherlands investor and the
Slovak Republic falling under the BIT is not a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the EU and
TFEU Treaties.” 111 In addition, as national courts can
review the arbitration award a dispute settlement clause
cannot itself undermine the role of the CJEU as:
[I]t is for those national courts and tribunals
to ascertain whether it is necessary for them
to make a reference to the Court under
Opinion of AG Wathelet, (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=440D2F843998
9EA741E9919B1F93CD24?text=&docid=194583&pageIndex=0&doclang=e
n&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1139837.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
108
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Article 267 TFEU in order to obtain an
interpretation or assessment of the validity
of provisions of EU law which they may
need to apply when reviewing an
arbitration award.112
The Advocate contended that the arbitral tribunal
did conform with the Article 267 TFEU criteria for a court
or tribunal.113 The Advocate based his reasoning on the fact
that he regarded the tribunal to be ‘established by law’, a
permanent arbitral institution and satisfied the compulsory
jurisdiction criterion.114
After assessment of the dispute settlement clause,
the AG asserted that although “Article 18 TFEU requires
that the persons in a situation governed by (EU) law to be
governed be placed on a completely equal footing with
nationals of the Member State.” However, there is no
discrimination when a Member State may choose not to
provide the nationals of a third Member State the treatment
it provides to Member States’ nationals under the BIT. 115
Essentially the dispute settlement clause was part of the BIT
and cannot be abandoned.
The CJEU in its judgment distinguished between
commercial and investment arbitration. Namely, that
commercial arbitration is compatible with EU law as long as
the awards are subject to limited review within national
courts. This allows for opportunities for EU provisions to be
examined and interpreted during the course of the reviews,
also providing an opportunity for the use of preliminary
reference.116 In contrast, the Intra-EU BIT in question was
Id.
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id; Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV. Case 126/97. It
was held in this case that Article 85 EC was vital to the operation of the internal
market. The content of this article would be deemed to be a matter of public
112
113
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not an international investment treaty concluded by the EU.
Therefore, it is not compatible with the EU, as its dispute
settlement clause does not adhere to the principle of mutual
trust between Member States.117
The CJEU began its judgment outlining the
autonomy of EU law, namely that:
“EU law is characterised by the fact that it
stems from an independent source of law,
the Treaties, by its primacy over the laws
of the Member States, and by the direct
effect of a whole series of provisions which
are applicable to their nationals and to the
Member States themselves. Those
characteristics have given rise to a
structured network of principles, rules and
mutually independent legal relations
binding the EU and its Member States.”118
In the above statement, the Court has reiterated the
instrumental principle of “an autonomous EU legal order,”
which it developed within the historic Van Gend and Costa
judgments. 119 The concept of “autonomy” was further
advanced to reinforce the principles of direct effect and the
supremacy of EU law. Lenk then extends the concept of
autonomy into two dimensions.120 The first dimension looks
at the CJEU presenting the autonomous claim, which
prohibits international law from having any impact on EU
law; EU law is a ‘self-referential’ system.121 In the second
policy with the terms of the New York Convention. EU law required any issues
relating to Article 85 EC to be subject to the examination of national courts in
the consideration of Arbitral awards. An arbitral award should be annulled by
a national court if it is breach of Article 85 EC. Eco Swiss, supra.
117
Id.
118
Slovak Republic v Achmea, 2018 ECLI: EU: C, ¶ 33.
119
Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, 12. Page 39. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v.
ENEL., 594.
120
Id. at 40.
121
Id.
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dimension the CJEU broadens ‘autonomy’ to include its
institutional structures and prerogatives.122 This dimension
results in protecting the institutional dimensions of the EU
legal order from international law.123
The Court emphasised that under Article 2 TEU
Member States share common values and an understanding
of mutual trust between them.124 Under Article 19 TEU the
Member States, the national courts and the Court have the
duty to warrant the application of EU law.125 The national
courts and the Court are intertwined through judicial
dialogue via the Article 267 TFEU preliminary ruling
procedure to ensure uniform interpretation of EU law. 126
The Court then proceeded to determine whether or not the
dispute resolution provision of the BIT was in contravention
of Article 267 TFEU and Article 344 TFEU.127
In contrast to the Advocate’s opinion, the Court
ruled that the proceedings conducted within the tribunal did
relate to the interpretation or application of EU and in
particular, the freedoms provided through the single
market.128 Therefore, in theory the tribunal maybe called
upon to interpret and apply EU law.129 The Court seemed to
apply the literal interpretation in reading Article 344 TFEU
to mean that it applied to all disputes including those
between Member State and individuals (i.e. investor-state
disputes).130 The Member State, by accepting the tribunal’s
jurisdiction, had acknowledged its jurisdiction in areas that

Id.
Id.
124
Slovak Republic v. Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, ¶ 34.
125
Id. at ¶ 36.
126
Id. at ¶ 35–37.
127
Id. at ¶ 23.
128
Id. at ¶ 58–59.
129
Id. at ¶ 42.
130
Jens Hillebrand Pohl, Intra-EU Investment Arbitration After the Achmea
Case: Legal Autonomy Bounded by Mutual Trust? 14 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 767,
776 (2018).
122
123
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may intersect with EU law, even though the role of the
tribunal was to rule on disputes relating to the BIT.131
In considering whether the tribunal was a court or
tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU preliminary
reference procedures, the Court affirmed that the tribunal
was not part of the EU judicial system.132 The tribunal did
not form part of the Slovak or Dutch domestic law.133 In fact,
it is the ‘exceptional nature of the tribunal’s jurisdiction’,
which makes it a lucrative choice for the parties. 134 The
power of the arbitrator to decide its jurisdiction makes it
unique and therefore excluded from the Brussels I
Regulation. 135 Arbitrators may be able to issue anti-suit
injunctions to allow arbitral awards to be enforced. In this
case, if the tribunal were perceived as a court of the Member
State, this in turn would constrain the autonomy of the
tribunal, an essential feature of the dispute settlement
mechanism. 136 Hence, the tribunal could not make an
Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference to the CJEU. 137
The Court also pointed out that in this scenario the award
could be subjected to the review of a Member State and then
that Member State court may request for a preliminary
hearing.138 This particular procedure of a potential review
of an award may be limited by national law. 139 Hence,
ultimately the dispute settlement provision could not secure

Id.
Slovak Republic v. Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, ¶ 43.
133
Id. at ¶ 45.
134
Id.
135
Commission Regulation 1215/2012 of Dec. 12, 2012, Recognizing and
enforcing of judgements in civil and commercial matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1,
2 at ¶ 12.
136
Vanessa Thieffry, The Achmea Judgment: An Additional Stage in the
Construction of a Group of International Litigation Resolution Mechanism? An
Analysis in the Light of French Arbitration Law, 3 INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, 201–16 (2018).
137
Slovak Republic v. Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, ¶ 49.
138
Id. at ¶ 50.
139
Id. at ¶ 51.
131
132
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the full effectiveness of EU law. 140 Subsequently, it is
recommended that all member state national laws should
allow national courts to review the arbitral awards to
overcome this problem in the near future.
To sum up, the CJEU within its notable
international commercial arbitration cases has favoured the
jurisdiction of the national court rather than the originally
chosen arbitral tribunal between the parties. Its reason for
this hostility lies with the fact that if a national court were to
award an anti-suit injunction (in essence to allow the parties
to revert to the arbitral tribunal rather than rely on a national
court), this would be in breach of the principle of mutual
trust and confidence between the Member States. For
investment arbitration matters as highlighted in Achmea, the
Court has then further relied on the principle of autonomy
and mutual trust and confidence to protect its jurisdiction. It
makes a clear distinction between the role of an arbitral
tribunal and national court. It emphasizes that those
tribunals do not have access to the CJEU via the Article 267
TFEU preliminary procedure. Hence, in essence they will
not have the legal base to interpret and adjudicate on the
validity of EU law. Rather such matters are best placed
within the jurisdiction of the Member State national courts,
which have unrestricted access to the CJEU if they require
interpretation of EU law.
II.

Court v. Tribunal Battle for Autonomy;
Autonomy and More Autonomy
Some contend the CJEU’s interpretation of
autonomy from Achmea and previous cases has evolved into
the Court protecting its own judicial prerogatives, while
restricting the EU’s development as an international actor.141
Id. at ¶ 56.
Laurens Ankersmit, Achmea: The Beginning of the End for ISDS in and with
Europe?, Investment Treaty News, (Apr. 24, 2018)
https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2018/04/24/achmea-the-beginning-of-the-end-forisds-in-and-with-europe-laurens-ankersmit/.
140
141
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This Court’s reasoned it may have negative implications on
EU investment agreements as the EU is expanding its
external competencies via trade agreements such as the
Canadian CETA Agreement. 142 The CETA contains an
international dispute settlement mechanism, which is based
upon arbitration discussed later within this paper. 143 The
CJEU references the principle of its autonomy over
international courts and tribunals in the Mox Plant case.144
In the aforementioned case, Ireland brought arbitral
proceedings against the UK under the United Nation
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for
reprocessing plutonium in the Mox Plant.145 The UNCOS
tribunal stayed the proceedings and permitted the parties ask
to the Court to determine if it had jurisdiction considering
the sizeable impact of the case on EU environmental
legislation and EURATOM. 146 The CJEU concluded that
Article 344 TFEU prevented the member states from
initiating proceedings before any court or tribunal if the
disputed matter is within exclusive EU competence. 147
Based on a wider interpretation of the MOX Plant and
Achmea cases, Article 344 of the TFEU would restrict the
member states from filing their disputes to any other judicial
body other than the CJEU in matters of exclusive EU

See Dan Cooper & Rosie Klement, CJEU: EU-Canada Proposed Agreement
on the Transfer of Passenger Name Record Data Does Not Conform to EU Data
Protection Law Standards, COVINGTON (July 31, 2017)
https://www.insideprivacy.com/international/european-union/cjeu-eu-canadaproposed-agreement-on-the-transfer-of-passenger-name-record-data-does-notconform-to-eu-data-protection-lawstandards/#:~:text=The%20proposed%20Agreement%20permits%20air,and%
20other%20third%20countries%2C%20for.
143
Id.
144
Case C-459/03, Comm’n v. Ir., 2006 E.C.R I-4657 (May 30, 2006),
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=57551&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2769404.
145
Id.
146
Id. at ¶¶ 42, 46.
147
Id. at ¶¶ 126–127.
142
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competence. 148 Although the CJEU approved the second
EEA draft agreement, which restricted the jurisdiction of the
EEA court to encompass EFTA countries and bind CJEU
preliminary rulings, the previous two European Economic
Area (EEA) opinions of the CJEU highlight the Court’s
commitment to preserve the integrity of the EU. 149 In
Opinion 1/91, the CJEU evaluated the draft agreement
establishing the EEA and argued the draft agreement
negatively impacted “the autonomy of the (EU) legal
order.”150 The EEA agreement proposed for an EEA Court,
which would provide jurisdiction on EEA-related matters
came across to the CJEU as an attempt to restrain its internal
Treaty application.151 Here, the CJEU protected the integrity
of EU law externally by excluding international courts and
tribunals from interpreting and applying EU law.
Nevertheless, the CJEU once again delivered its opinion on
the establishment of the European Common Aviation Area
(ECAA). However, the ECAA did not establish a judicial
court but aimed to form a committee that would interpret the
agreement.152 The Court acknowledged conformity with the
autonomy principle of the international court or tribunal
required compliance with two conditions. Firstly, the
international tribunal cannot bind the EU and its institutions
to a particular interpretation of EU law. Secondly, it cannot
undermine the allocated powers to EU institutions under the
corresponding EU treaty. 153 This most evidently would
include the CJEU’s exclusive right to the interpretation of
the allocation of competencies. The Court in Opinion 1/09
See Stian Øby Johansen, The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in
Opinion 2/13 and Its Potential Consequences, GER. L.J. (2015).
149
Case 1/91 ,Cmty. on the one hand and the countries of the Eur. Free Trade
Ass’n, 1 E.C.R. (Dec. 14); Case 1/92, Amendment Draft EEA Agreement, 1
E.C.R. (Apr. 10).
150
See Opinion 1/91, supra note 149 at ¶ 35.
151
Id. at ¶¶ 41–46.
152
Case 1/100, Eur. Common Aviation Area, 1 E.C.R. (Apr. 2018).
153
Id. at ¶ 13.
148
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confronted the challenge of determining whether the
European Patents Court (EPC) compatibility with the EU
legal order.154 The CJEU contended the EPC would take
over the national courts duty of interpreting EU patents law,
as it, “would deprive those courts of their task, as ‘ordinary’
courts within the European Union legal order, to implement
European Union law and thereby of the power provided for
in Article 267.” 155 The Court seemed to advance the
principle of autonomy by extension of the definition of EU
institutions to cover domestic courts. In Opinion 2/13, the
CJEU rejected the draft accession agreement of the EU to
the ECHR. The Court declined the draft agreement’s
proposal to be presented with preliminary references
concerning only EU primary law interpretation. In such
circumstances, the Court stated “there would be most
certainly be a breach of the principle that the Court of Justice
has exclusive jurisdiction over the definitive interpretation
of EU law.”156 The Court further affirmed the autonomy
principle also extended to the CJEU”s earlier engagement
requirement to ensure the compatibility of the international
agreement with EU treaties. The Court declared that “the
necessity for the prior involvement of the Court of Justice in
a case. . . in which EU law is at issue satisfies the
requirement that the competences of the EU and the powers
of its institutions, notably the Court of Justice be
preserved.”157
The Court’s reasoning in all the above cases
demonstrates its deliberate shift to focusing on protecting
institutional prerogatives rather than the preserving the
integrity of law. The recent judgments, including Achmea,
underline how institutionalized the autonomy is by
protecting the CJEU’s powers to interpret EU law via
Draft agreement, Creation of a Unified Patent Litigation System, Advisory
Opinion, 1137 E.C.R. (Mar. 2011).
155
Id. at ¶ 80.
156
Id. at ¶ 246.
157
Id. at ¶ 237.
154
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national courts. It’s also suggested that the principle of
autonomy does not assume that the international court or
tribunal has express authority to interpret EU law because
the courts’ judicial activity manages to evade judicial
dialogue.158
The court in Achmea was criticised for bolstering
the outdated exclusivist and expansionist concept of the
autonomy of the EU legal order on the grounds that
international law does not allow for hierarchy between
international treaties.159 Similarly, it is argued that the scope
of the BIT within Achmea is wider than the EU treaties since
it covers state actions or omissions that are likely to affect a
foreign investor and his investments.160 The court’s rulings
are mocked as ‘pure utopia’ and unrealistic since the EU
constantly engages with international bodies. Thus, it is not
feasible for EU law to be sheltered from external bodies and
international bodies will have to interpret EU law for
themselves.
Achmea has caused a considerable stir within the
EU as it is depicted to not only provide a judgment on
foreign investment, but also on the dispute settlement
mechanisms used between two or more member states. It
highlights the constitutional objectives pursued by the CJEU.
Namely, that the foundations of EU law are preserved
through the protection of the preliminary hearing process.
The CJEU required that for arbitral awards be subject to full
review by the host state’s domestic court. This was justified
by the Court’s need to protect European citizens’ rights and

Mark Burgstaller, Dispute Settlement in EU International Investment
Agreements with Third States: Three Salient Problems, 15 J. OF WORLD INV. &
TRADE 551, 562 (July 28, 2014).
159
Segolene Barbou des Places, Emanuele Cimiotta, & Juan Santos Vara,
Achmea Between the Orthodoxy of the Court of Justice and Its Multi-Faceted
Implications: An Introduction, 4 EUR. PAPERS 1, 7–10 (2019),
www.europeanpapers.eu.
160
Id. at 11.
158
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build mutual trust.161 As “Article 8 of the BIT is such as to
call into question not only the principle of mutual trust
between the Member States but also the preservation of the
particular nature of the law established by the Treaties,
ensured by the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in
Article 267 TFEU.”162 Critics say that Achmea could not
have been decided differently because “the principles of
autonomy and mutual trust prevent Member States from
offering—and EU citizens from accepting—a system of
dispute resolution outside the Treaties when EU law is both
the means and the end in the life cycle of intra-EU
investment.”163
The intense support of autonomy in the EU led to
twenty-two member states to sign declarations in January
2019. 164 The Declaration bound the member states to
declare all investor-state arbitration clauses between
member states to be contrary to EU law and therefore
invalid. 165 Consequently, on October 24, 2019, the
Commission announced that the EU member states agreed
in a plurilateral treaty to terminate their intra-EU BITs. This
treaty was signed and ratified by the EU member states on
May 5, 2020 and went into effect on August 29, 2020.166
Places, supra note 159, at 11.
Slovak Republic v. Achmea, supra note 2.
163
Sonsoles Centeno Huera & Nicolaj Kuplewatzky, Achmea, The Autonomy
of Union Law, Mutual Trust and What Lies Ahead, 4 EUR. PAPERS 1, 61, 68
(2019).
164
DECLARATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
MEMBER STATES ON THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE IN ACHMEA AND ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION, 1, 1–2, (Jan. 15, 2019).
165
Id. at 3–4.
166
Charbel A. Moarbes, Agreement for the Termination of Bilateral Investment
Treaties Between the Member States of The European Union, CAMBRIDGE
UNIV. PRESS (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-legalmaterials/article/abs/agreement-for-the-termination-of-bilateral-investmenttreaties-between-the-member-states-of-the-europeanunion/4B6FAE84B12BA9A950B92B51FCD66310.
161
162
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Contrastingly, the tribunals have not rejected cases
based on lack of jurisdiction on the basis that EU member
states never had the competence to consent to intra-EU
arbitration. 167 This is despite the agreement among the
arbitral tribunals established under BITs and the ECT that
EU law would be applied between an investor from one
member state and another member state.168 In UP and C.D
Holdings v. Hungary, the tribunal held that “in the present
award, the tribunal does not consider that a detailed
discussion of the substance of Achmea is required, because
the present case differs in determinative aspects from the
case in Achmea.”169 The tribunal argued this on the basis
that UP and C.D Holding Internationale was bound by the
ICSID Convention. 170
The validity of the ICSID
Convention had not been questioned following Achmea.
This reasoning was also held in Marfin Investment Group v.
The Republic of Cyprus where it was acclaimed that the
tribunal’s jurisdiction comprised of the Treaty and the ICSID
Convention.171 Additionally, Article 25, subsection 1 of the
ICSID Convention states that the ICSID extends its
jurisdiction to any dispute directly arising out of an
investment and the parties to the dispute must provide their
written consent to submit to the ICSID.172
The tribunals in Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief
U.A. v. Spain and Vattenfall AB v. Germany found that
Achmea was limited to the BIT between the Netherlands and
Slovakia and should not include the ECT. 173 Masdar in
particular approved the Advocate General’s opinion in
Huera, supra note 163, at 68.
Id. at 68, n.45.
169
UP and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ARB/13/35, ¶ 252 (2018).
170
Id. at 257.
171
Marfin Investment Group v. The Republic of Cyprus, ARB/13/27 (2018).
172
Chapter II: Jurisdiction of the Centre, Article 25, ICSID (Apr. 10, 2006),
https://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/partachap02.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2022).
173
Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Spain, ARB/14/1/1, 1, 212 ¶ 679
(2018); Vattenfall AB v. Germany, ARB/12/12, 1, 9 ¶ 27 (2018).
167
168
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Achmea.174 Whereas the Vattenfall tribunal disregarded EU
law by limiting their freedom of action, EU Member States
cannot rely on conflict of law rules provided through
international law (i.e. Article 16 ECT).175
In sum, the CJEU has rigorously relied on the
principle of autonomy to protect its judicial prerogatives.
Furthermore, Achmea highlights that the Court did not want
to limit its ruling for bilateral treaties between Member
States; rather the Court referred to “a provision in an
international agreement concluded between Member
States.” 176 Subsequently, Achmea acknowledges Articles
267 and 344 of the TFEU create an exclusive territory for
jurisdiction for dispute resolution between the Member
States, and the Court was not bound by the reasoning
provided by the Advocate General.177 The tribunal has not
considered the certainty of EU law and the obligations that
it creates for the Member States because it consistently
retains jurisdiction on BIT related disputes. 178 The only
hope is for the tribunals to utilize an EU compatible
approach and apply Achmea.
III.

ICS /CETA/Opinion 1/17/MIC/ WA/TCA:
Winds Of Change Or Back In The Same
Direction?
The CJEU’s holding in Achmea risks portraying the
EU as demanding and mistrusting of other legal investment
Masdar, ARB/14/1/1 at 212 ¶ 680.
Vattenfall AB v. Fed. Republic Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12,
Decision on the Achmea Issue, 61-62, 63-65 (Aug. 31, 2018). See also Kirstin
Schwedt & Hannes Ingwersen, Intra-EU ECT Claims Post-Achmea: Vattenfall
Decision Paves the Way, WOLTERS KLUWER: ARB. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2018),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/12/13/intra-eu-ect-claimspost-achmea-vattenfall-decision-paves-the-way/.
176
Case C-284-16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, ¶ 60
(Mar. 6, 2018).
177
Id. at ¶¶ 17, 60.
178
See Carrie E. Ander, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the EU Legal Order:
Implications of the Lisbon Treaty, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 851, 854 (2010).
174
175
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protection regimes. This may not accommodate the EU’s
expanding international trade relations, as many of these
trade agreements provide for investor-state dispute
settlement provisions. 179 The Lisbon Treaty provides
exclusive competence over foreign direct investment. 180
Thus, the EU uses the arbitral tribunal as a dispute settlement
mechanism within the Trade and Cooperation Agreement
(TCA), which the EU and UK are parties to.181 Furthermore,
the EU has shifted towards innovation by opting for
Investment Court Systems (ICS) in the Free Trade
Agreements with Canada (CETA), Singapore (EUSFTA)
and Vietnam (EUVFTA).182
The new set up of the ICS is designed to address the
lack of legitimacy, independence, and public contention.183
The institutional design for the appointment of the judges is
similar to established international dispute settlement
bodies.184 The permeant judges are appointed by contracting
states for a fixed term period, with the possibility of
reappointment if needed. 185 The appointment and fixed
tenure of the judges mitigates ICS’ original pro-investor bias,
which existed because private companies employed the

Investment Disputes, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/disputesettlement/investment-disputes/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).
180
Treaty of Lisbon art. 2(B)(1), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306).
181
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, EU-U.K., art. 739, Apr. 30, 2021, 2021
O.J. (L 149).
182
Guillaume Croisant, Opinion 1/17—The CJEU Confirms That CETA’s
Investment Court System is Compatible With EU Law, WOLTERS KLUWER: ARB.
BLOG (Apr. 30, 2019),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/04/30/opinion-117-the-cjeuconfirms-that-cetas-investment-court-system-is-compatible-with-eu-law/.
183
Dietz, Dotzauer & Cohen, supra note 15.
184
See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 3–4, 18. The
International Court of Justice is composed of 15 judges who are elected for
nine-year terms by the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly.
185
Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, arts. 8.27(1),
8.27(5), Oct. 30, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 11) [hereinafter CETA].
179

523

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

33

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 5
[Vol. 22: 491, 2022]

ADR in the EU
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

judges.186 The code of conduct for judges within the new
Free Trade Agreements ensures that the judges cannot act as
lawyers for any of the parties because they will need to
disclose their past and present activities that could affect the
exercise of their duties. 187 This ensures that the ICS favors
judges trained in public law rather than lawyers specializing
in commercial law.188
To provide transparency, the ICS adopted the 2014
United Nations Commission on International Trade
(UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency in CETA. 189 This
requires the ICS proceedings to be in public and open to third
party submissions, and for documents and decisions to be
made available to the public.190 Notwithstanding the ICS’
changes to align with the UNCITRAL Rules, the EU could
have taken further steps to overcome it’s negative public
perception.191 This could include publishing the names of
the judicial panel on the EU website;192 overtime, this would
lead to a useful database of current and historical
appointments. Second, even though judges’ wages are fixed,
they could receive remuneration (e.g., the EU could charge
the judiciary penalties for submitting awards unjustifiably
PIA EBERHARDT, ICS: THE WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING 31 (2016),
https://www.worldpsi.org/sites/default/files/documents/research/en_wolfics_web.pdf.
187
E.g., CETA, supra note 185, at art. 8.30. See also Proposal for Council
Decision on the Position to be Taken on Behalf of the European Union in the
Committee on Services and Investment Established Under the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada, of the One Part, and
the European Union and its Member States, of the Other Part of the Other Part
as Regards the Adoption of a Code of Conduct for Members of the Tribunal,
the Appellate Tribunal and Mediators, COM (2019) 459 final (Oct. 11, 2019).
188
See EBERHARDT, supra note 186, at 10–11.
189
CETA, supra note 185, at art. 8.36.
190
Id.; Int’l Trade L. Comm’n, Arb. Rules, arts. 2–4, 6(1), U.N. Doc. A/31/98
(Dec. 16, 2013).
191
See, e.g., EBERHARDT, supra note 186.
192
Cf. Elections and Appointments for EU Institutions, EUR. UNION,
https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/leadership/electionsand-appointments_en (last visited Mar. 1, 2022) (failing to personally name
past and present ISC justices).
186
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late unless the judicial panel could show the delay was out
of the judicial panel’s control or due to exceptional
circumstances).193 At the same time, the ICS could increase
the fees of the judicial panel if the case dealt with the
expeditious conduct of the judicial panel.
The ICS also provides an appellate body to
overcome the legitimacy concerns of the old investor-state
dispute settlement systems.194 Under CETA, the appellate
tribunal is appointed by the CETA Joint Committee and can
reverse, modify, or uphold the tribunal’s decision. 195 The
problem here is that precedent would be established. Any
new investment protection regime would have its own
appellate body and apply its own case law, leading to
inconsistencies in investment case law.196 Therefore, the EU
must develop a multilateral appellate body that could
establish consistent international precedent.197
Notwithstanding, in 2016 the European
Commission introduced the Multilateral Investment Court
(MIC) through a Recommendation.198 The aim was to have
a multilateral court that would adjudicate investment
disputes arising under all of the bilateral agreements rather
than a separate bilateral investment court operating for each
Free Trade Agreement.199 Subsequently, the Commission is
working on a multilateral level to gain support for MIC.200
For instance, court fees could be reduced by 5-10% for awards submitted for
scrutiny up to seven months after the last substantive hearing or written
submission, 10-20% for awards submitted after seven to ten months, and up to
25% for awards submitted after ten months.
194
Dietz, Dotzauer & Cohen, supra note 15, at 764–65.
195
CETA, supra note 185, at art. 6.10.
196
Dietz, Dotzauer & Cohen, supra note 15, at 765.
197
Id.
198
Recommendation for a Council Decision Authorising the Opening of
Negotiations for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, COM (2017) 493 final (Sept. 13, 2017).
199
Id.
200
Commission Presents Procedural Proposals for the Investment Court
System in CETA, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 11, 2019),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2070.
193
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It submitted Establishing a Standing mechanism for the
settlement of international investment disputes to the
UNCITRAL Working Group for the reform of investor-state
dispute settlement mechanisms, which set out the EU’s
position for the establishment of a MIC with a work plan for
the process. 201 This exchange exhibits the EU’s keen
interest in the reform process of investor-state dispute
settlement mechanisms through participating within the
UNCITRAL forum and creating trade policies, which
contain judicial forums for the resolution of investment
disputes in new trade agreements.202
More recently in Opinion 1/17, the Court confirmed
the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism under
CETA is compatible with EU law.203 This followed from
Belgium’s request for the Court’s opinion on the
compatibility of EU law with CETA’s ICS provision.204 The
CETA came into force in 2017, except for the investment
provisions.205 Belgium also requested the CJEU to consider
the EU’s compatibility with the CETA ICS about:
(i)
the exclusive competence of the CJEU to provide
the definitive interpretation of EU law;
(ii)
the general principle of equality;
(iii)
the requirement that EU law is effective; and
Submission of the European Union and its Member States to UNCITRAL
Working Group III: Establishing a Standing Mechanism for the Settlement of
International Investment Disputes (Jan. 28, 2019),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf.
202
Erika Szyszczak, Opinion 1/17: Towards A Modern EU Approach to
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, U.K. TRADE POL’Y OBSERVATORY (May
2019), https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/publications/opinion-1-17-towards-amodern-eu-approach-to-investor-state-dispute-settlement/.
203
Op. 1/17 of the Ct., ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, ¶ 108 (May 16, 2017) [hereinafter
Op. 1/17].
204
Id.
205
Artis Pabriks, EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), EUR. PARL.: LEGIS. TRAIN SCHEDULE,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-andprogressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-ceta (last visited Mar. 1,
2022).
201

526

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol22/iss2/5

36

Ahmed: ADR in the EU
[Vol. 22: 491, 2022]

ADR in the EU
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

(iv)

the right to an independent and impartial
judiciary.206
In context to the principle of autonomy, the Court
stated that “‘an international agreement providing for the
establishment of a court responsible for the interpretation of
its provisions and whose decisions are binding on the
institutions, including the Court of Justice, is not in principle
incompatible with EU law’ . . . [p]rovided that ‘. . . the
autonomy of the EU and its legal order is respected’”.207
The Court first distinguished Achmea on the
grounds of mutual trust; this principle would not apply to EU
and third countries.208 Second, the Court pointed out that the
autonomy of the EU’s legal order is not breached because
the CETA’s ICS is outside the EU judicial system.209 The
autonomy of the EU legal order would only be breached if
the CETA tribunal interpreted and applied EU rules rather
than the CETA provisions, or if the CETA tribunal issued
awards which restricted the EU institutions from operating
in accordance with the EU constitutional order.210 The Court
agreed that this was not the case here.211 The Court clarified
that the CETA investment chapter provisions ensure that the
measures adopted to satisfy public interest would not be
challenged on the basis of the Treaty. 212 Yet, the Court
confirmed that the CETA tribunal would have to abide by
the national court judgments while the national courts would
not be bound to the interpretation of domestic law by the
CETA tribunal.213 The CETA tribunal would also not have
access to the preliminary procedure because this is only

Szyszczak, supra note 15.
Op. 1/17, supra note 203, at ¶ 57.
208
Id. at ¶¶ 126, 128–29.
209
Id. at ¶ 115.
210
Op. 1/17, supra note 203, at ¶¶ 106–61; CETA, supra note 185, at art. 8.21.
211
Op. 1/17, supra note 203, at ¶ 161.
212
Id. at ¶ 151.
213
CETA, supra note 185, at art. 8.31(2).
206
207
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possible via access through the national courts. 214
Subsequently, it seems that the Court has overlooked the
problems that would arise if the CETA tribunal provided a
decision that was based on a misinterpretation of EU law.
The Court has not really explored the option of the tribunal
gaining access to a preliminary ruling—although it was of
paramount consideration within the incompatibility decision
given by the Court in Achmea.215
Regarding the principle of equal treatment, the
Court stated
the difference in treatment arises from the
fact that it will be impossible for
enterprises and natural persons of member
states that invest within the Union and that
are subject to EU law to challenge EU
measures before the tribunals envisaged by
the CETA, whereas Canadian enterprises
and natural persons that invest within the
same commercial or industrial sector of the
EU internal market will be able to
challenge those measures before those
tribunals.216
The Court here compared EU investors investing in Canada
against Canadian investors investing within the EU and held
that both parties would have equal access to the CETA
tribunal and provisions; therefore, there was no difference in
treatment.217
The Court acknowledged that the CETA tribunal
decisions would not compromise the effectiveness of EU
competition law because this would be within the public
interest.218 If, “in exceptional circumstances, an award by
Szyszczak, supra note 15.
Id.
216
Op. 1/17, supra note 203, at ¶ 179.
217
Id.
218
Id. at ¶ 181.
214
215
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the CETA Tribunal . . . might have the consequence of
cancelling out the effects of a fine,” issued because of breach
of competition laws, this would be allowed, because EU law
itself permits annulment of a fine when that fine is vitiated
by a defect corresponding to that which could be identified
by the CETA tribunal.219
The Court did not find the CETA tribunal in breach;
rather it acknowledged that the CETA tribunal would
provide better access for vulnerable private individuals and
small and medium sized enterprises.220 CETA also provides
procedural guarantees to ensure the CETA tribunal’s
independence like remuneration schemes, removal and
appointment of judges, and rules on ethics.221 In particular,
the Court regards the CETA Joint Committee to function
independently of the CETA tribunal because the CETA Joint
Committee does not retain unlimited discretionary
powers.222
This is an important decision because it supports
replacing the investment arbitral tribunal with a multilateral
permanent court because the Court itself has envisaged the
setting up of a “multilateral investment tribunal in the longer
term.” 223 Nonetheless, the Court will not allow Opinion
1/17 to affect the autonomy of the EU legal order.224 The
principle of autonomy exists in international law and
Member States’ legislation.225 It is based on the EU’s own
constitutional framework derived from TEU Article 2. 226
Subsequently, the Court will not allow any ICS or MIC to
halt the Union from proceeding with its own constitutional

Id. at ¶ 186.
Id. at ¶ 213.
221
Id. at ¶¶ 202–04.
222
Id. at ¶¶ 234, 228.
223
Id. at ¶ 108.
224
Id. at ¶ 109.
225
Id. at ¶ 110.
226
Id.
219
220
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framework.227 The Court was adamant that ICS must not
interpret EU law, and any investment protection provisions
should allow access to independent courts as established in
the CETA provisions.228 If the MIC is to succeed then it will
need to deliver on personal integrity, transparent judicial
appointment procedures, lower costs, and shorter duration in
proceedings.229
A new multilateral court may offer revised
procedural laws adapted for the particular requirements of
individual disputes that may include: enforcement
mechanisms, judicial limitation of the subject matter of the
case, limiting the unsuccessful party to reimbursement of the
necessary costs, and accelerated processes with procedural
timelines as done by the WTO.230 The court may utilise the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency to ensure that it abides
with international standards as it is currently within the
CETA provisions.231 Transparency could also be achieved
if the procedural documents were available, unless their
access presented any public interest issues.232 Negotiations
before the new court should be open to the public and allow
third parties to provide submissions on those pending
cases.233 To be legitimate, the new court must enforce its
awards.234 Setting up an enforcement fund that would pay
judgements up to a maximum amount would be useful for
small enterprises that cannot afford to carry out enforcement
proceedings against the defendant.235 The new investment
court’s structure would need to be designed to provide
See id.
Id. at ¶¶ 120, 189.
229
Marc Bungenberg, The Multilateral Investment Court-Royal Road or Dead
End for the EU Legal Order? 5 INT’L BUS. L.J. 471, 478 (2019).
230
Id. at 480–81.
231
Id. at 480. Cf. CETA, supra note 185, at art. 8.36.
232
Bungenberg, supra note 229, at 480. See also CETA, supra note 185, at art.
8.36; Int’l Trade L. Comm’n, supra note 190.
233
See Bungenberg, supra note 229, at 480.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 480.
227
228
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individuals access to the court.236 It could potentially share
its infrastructure with institutions like the ICSID but would
need its “own organs and independent personality.”237 The
costs of the court, including judicial salaries, would be
consumed by the contracting states depending on their share
of global investment. 238 By joining the new court, the
contracting states would agree that the new court would
“replace all other dispute resolution mechanisms,” which
would gradually eliminate the use of ad hoc arbitration.239
The contracting member states would appoint the bench of
judges.240 These judges could be selected in accordance to
their expertise and would be appointed via a selection
process based on the Council of Europe.241
Following Brexit and the lengthy negotiations
between the EU and the U.K., the TCA between the parties
concluded. 242 The TCA also incorporated a dispute
settlement mechanism, providing the parties to “request for
the establishment of an arbitration tribunal.”243 This dispute
settlement mechanism is limited to resolving disputes
between the parties and the interpretation needs to be “in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
law.” 244 The rulings and decisions of this tribunal are
binding on the parties. 245 The tribunal has international
jurisdiction and is tasked to resolve the relevant disputes
between parties in international law and “not to determine
the legality of a measure alleged to constitute a breach of this

Id. at 481.
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 481–82.
240
Id. at 482.
241
Id.
242
Council Decision 2020/2252, art. 12, 2020 O.J. (L 444/2). Council Decision
2021/689, art. 1, 2021 O.J. (L 149/2) [hereinafter TCA].
243
TCA, supra note 242, at art. 737.
244
Id. at art. 4.
245
Id. at art. 754.
236
237
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Agreement or any supplementing agreement, under the
domestic law of a Party.”246
The provisions on the use of dispute settlement
mechanisms do not apply to all areas of the agreement,
including law enforcement and judicial cooperation. 247
They apply to areas such as trade, transport, and fisheries.248
The dispute settlement mechanism will not operate or be
adapted into any form to overstep the role of the CJEU
within the EU legal order or the Withdrawal Agreement
(WA).249 The national courts will have no jurisdiction in the
settlement of disputes under the TCA. 250 In addition, no
decision of the arbitral tribunal would bind the national
courts of either of the parties regarding the meaning of
national law.251 This results in a two tier legal system with
no interrelation between the domestic law of the concerned
parties and the international law regimes of the parties.252 In
context, the CJEU is only the domestic court of the EU, and
not an international court, with authority to settle disputes or
provide binding interpretative judgments for all the
parties. 253 This aligns with recent trends of the EU to
confirm that an international agreement, in which it is a party,
may contain EU rules and yet not be under the exclusive
Id.
Id. at art. 696.
248
Id.
249
See Council of the European Union Agreement on the Withdrawal of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community. Official Journal of the
European Union, 2019 O.J. (C 384/1) 62 [hereinafter Withdrawal].
250
TCA, supra note 242, at art. 754.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
See Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EUR. UNION,
https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-andbodies/institutions-and-bodies-profiles/court-justice-european-unioncjeu_en#:~:text=The%20Court%20of%20Justice%20of,national%20governm
ents%20and%20EU%20institutions (last visited Mar. 1, 2022) (noting that the
CJEU “interprets EU law to make sure it is applied in the same way in all EU
countries, and settled legal disputes between national governments and EU
institution).
246
247
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jurisdiction of the CJEU.254 However, the inability of the
TCA dispute settlement mechanism to refer to the CJEU for
questions of interpretation of EU law will inevitably act as
an access barrier into the EU internal market for the UK
economic operators.
The TCA restricts the competences, decisions, and
rulings provided by the arbitral tribunal.255 The Partnership
Council (PC) has the competence of managing the TCA.256
Each party is entitled to refer disputes, including
interpretation and application of any agreements, to the
PC.257 The parties will aim to resolve matters in good faith
via consultations, which may be held within thirty days of a
written request from the complaining party. 258
If
consultations fail then the complaining party can request to
set up a tribunal.259 This would consist of three arbitrators
from a list of fifteen chosen persons by the parties.260 The
arbitral tribunal will deliver an interim report within 100
days of its establishment, unless both parties allow for time
not to exceed twelve months for negotiating an outcome to
the dispute.261 Each party may send a written request to the
tribunal to review certain areas of the interim report within
fourteen days of its delivery. 262 If no such objections are
received, the interim report will become the arbitral
tribunal’s ruling. 263 The arbitral tribunal’s rulings are
To reiterate, the CETA judgment the CJEU concluded that the CETA dispute
settlement mechanism did not undermine the autonomy of EU law as far as
domestic law being taken into account. See, e.g., CETA Agreement, supra note
185. That tribunal is expected to follow the prevailing interpretation given to
domestic law by the national courts while the national courts are not bound by
the tribunal’s interpretations on domestic law. Id.
255
TCA, supra note 242, at art. 738.
256
Id. at art. 10.
257
Id. at art. 738.
258
Id.
259
Id. at art. 739.
260
Id. at art. 752.
261
See id. at arts. 745 and 755.
262
Id. at 745.
263
Id.
254
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binding on the EU and the UK.264 The defeated party may
request a review from the arbitration tribunal of the relevant
compliance measures.265
However, if an arbitral tribunal is set it will be
ancillary to any other arrangements made by the parties to
settle the dispute aligned with the TCA or other mutually
agreed terms by the parties.266 Therefore, it seems that the
tribunal within the TCA has a limited role to act as a judicial
type mechanism in order to creatively interpret the TCA.267
Thus, there is a dispute settlement mechanism within the
TCA but it is limited in scope. Furthermore, this arbitral
tribunal may be subject to challenges by other dispute
mechanisms including the WA, which maintains a special
role for the CJEU in the practical aspects of the EU-UK
bilateral relationship including the protection of citizen’s
rights.268
The role of the CJEU is uniquely embedded within
the WA. This is understandable because the UK is a
common law system following the stare decisis principle,
which in itself may be a viable reason for the CJEU to remain
relevant with the UK legal system.269 Hence, it will continue
to have jurisdiction on any proceedings brought by or against
the UK before the transition period. 270 Arguably, it will
continue to have jurisdiction under Article 258 infringement
proceedings even after the transition period.271 In addition,
Id. at art. 754.
Id. at art. 748.
266
Id. at art. 756 (noting that “[t]he parties may at any times reach a mutually
agreed solution with respect to any dispute.”).
267
Id. at art. 754 (noting that “[t]he decisions and rulings of the arbitral
tribunal . . . shall not create any rights or obligations with respect to natural or
legal persons.”).
268
Id. at art. 174.
269
George T. Evans, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the
Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 23 Denver L. Rev. 32, 32–33 (1946).
270
Withdrawal, supra note 249, at art. 86. The end of the transition period was
set as December 31. 2020.
271
Withdrawal, supra note 249, at art. 87.
264
265
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WA Article 89 confirms the binding nature of these
judgments in their entirety on the UK.272 Furthermore, the
CJEU has jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on
cases that began within eight years from the end of the
transition period before a court or tribunal in the UK.273 In
particular, where a question is raised on Part Two of the
Agreement or where the court or tribunal deems it necessary
in order to provide a judgment in that case.274
Moreover, a similar stance is taken with cases
linked with Articles 18 and 19 on residence documents.275
Additionally, the CJEU case law is also relevant in a dispute
that is submitted to arbitration, which has raised questions
on the interpretation of EU law, a question related to the
interpretation of this agreement, or whether the UK has
compiled with its obligations under Art. 89(2). 276 The
arbitration panel needs to request CJEU to give jurisdiction
that will be binding on the arbitration panel.277
In sum, with the pressures of an ever-expanding EU
external trade portfolio, the EU is now utilizing arbitral
tribunals as formal dispute settlement mechanisms.278 This
is evident via the use of the CETA investment court and
more recently the establishment of such bodies within the
EU-UK Trade Agreement. 279 In the backdrop, the EU is
picking up momentum with its collaborative efforts with the
Member States to establish a more permanent Multilateral
Investment Court within the EU, which again highlights the
EU’s keen interest in the reform and adoption of such dispute
settlement mechanisms within the EU.280 The CJEU gave a
Id. at art. 89.
Id. at art. 158(1).
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 158(2).
277
Id.
278
See TCA, supra note 242.
279
Id.
280
CETA, supra note 185, at art. 8.29.
272
273
274
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green signal to the compatibility of the CETA Court against
EU law.281 However, this decision is again to be treated with
caution as the Court protects its jurisdiction by emphasizing
that such institutions are compatible with EU law only if the
autonomy of the EU and its legal order is not
compromised.282
The results of this study highlight that within
commercial and investment cases the CJEU has shown
resistance to the use of international dispute settlement
mechanisms. Rather it has supported the jurisdiction of the
Member State national courts. In doing so, it has protected
its jurisdiction. As ultimately, it considers that it should be
called upon reference in matters of interpretation and
validity of EU law. However, amongst the EU’s need to
expand its international trade portfolio, the Court has
declared the CETA Investment Court system to be
compatible with the EU legal order, which provides
encouraging news for those advocating for the use of other
dispute settlement mechanisms in the EU.283 In contrast to
Achmea where the Court pointed out that, the investor-tostate arbitration clauses in BITS concluded between Member
States were incompatible with EU law.284 This decision may
lead to a new type of jurisdiction eventually leading to a
multilateral court replacing tribunals although yet again the
EU has preferred the use of an arbitral tribunal within its
arrangement as illustrated within its recent trade agreement
with the UK.285 The CETA decision as it currently stands
validates the use of a permeant court with judges within free
trade agreements to adjudicate on investor-state disputes.286
This is a key step to the endorsement of “a uniform,
See Christian, supra note 7.
See id.
283
See id.
284
See Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Judgment (Dec. 11,
2013).
285
See TCA, supra note 242.
286
See Christian, supra note 7.
281
282
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independent and open judicial protection system for the legal
interests of investors in the EU.” 287 The new EU model
seems to inhibit the private control of arbitrators and global
investors and provides margin of growth of public control of
the arbitral decision-making processes through its
substantial reforms via the ICS and MIC systems.
Nevertheless, collectively both decisions of the Court
present one constant, namely that any “tribunal in question
would not have the power to bind the CJEU on matters of
EU law.” 288 If Brexit was a means to sever the CJEU’s
jurisdiction, then in reality the court has confirmed its
jurisdiction through the WA even beyond the transition
period in the interpretation of the treaties and the functioning
of the EU legal order.

Szyszcak, supra note 15.
Panos Koutrakos, More on autonomy-Opinion 1/17 (CETA), 3 EUROPEAN L.
REV. 44 (2019).
287
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